I am extremely sorry that I let a Hollywood distortion of a very good book keep me from discovering SLA Marshall years earlier. He actually was a veteran of the World War I, and was a renowned combat historian in World War II as well as Korea. He refined the technique of interviewing survivors, like yourself, immediately after an action; while memories were fresh, and hot, so as to piece together a vivid account. He must have just arrived at the 7th Division in time to debrief your 3rd Platoon support patrol after the loss of the I&R patrol.
King was relieved by Love Company with no time for us to describe the advantage that the Chinese had in getting to point Jack before we could, unless we departed the MLR immediately at dusk (before dark) and moved “quick time” to get set up before they arrived from their hill, to the East of the ford, and on our side of the Yok-kok-chon River; because of a 90 degree northward bend in the river just past the ford at the foot of point Jack.
When you read Marshall’s chapter “Hexed Patrol” and “Doomed Patrol” you will see how tragically uninformed they were about the terrain at all levels of command. They are given extremely complex orders, routes, and departure & arrival times with the objective of setting up ambushes at the ford; obviously not realizing that the Chinese were already on our side of the river from their positions in front of the Turks on our right flank. The Chinese that we killed and carried in from the King Company front always had dry feet and uniforms in February & March: Why would they be stupid enough to wade through a frigid ford?
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Any of our patrols departing much after dark were almost certain to be ambushed if they went out as far as Jack, or the valley floor, near the river; because the Chinese could easily get there first. We were early enough, on one occasion that you may have heard of, to get a support patrol set up on Jack from the 2nd. Platoon in time to wipe out a Chinese patrol that came noisily up the hill, talking out loud, evidently not used to GI’s being out that far so fast. They were so frustrated, that they yelled out a command to hit us from the rear.
Unfortunately for them, one of our two BAR men (George Ku), was a Chinese Hawaiian whose Grandmother had spoke that particular Chinese dialect around George at home; so that he understood enough of it to tell me what they had said. I had only been with the 2nd. platoon a day or so; standing in for Lt. “Po” Turner whose 2nd Platoon raiding patrol had been decimated near the ford, just below Jack, soon after leaving from their MLR sector (well after dark) down in the paddies on King’s right flank.
Our CO (1st.Lt.Jack Butler) had ask that I rehearse them for this support mission because they were the demoralized survivors of Lt. Turner’s ill-fated raiding party (you may recall having heard that chilling burst of burp guns ripping the night silence asunder with little, if any, return fire).
Evidently some higher echelon Operations Officer assumed that a support mission on Jack for a screening patrol to follow later, from a different unit, would be a light duty task for the demoralized 2nd. Platoon. The Platoon Sergeant who had been designated as patrol leader seemed hesitant to move out promptly at dusk, perhaps because of the recent trauma of the Turner ambush; or perhaps he was uncertain about the safety of a new short-cut path, across the paddies, out to the gap between Queen and Jack that his brand new Platoon Leader had laid out, aided by a mine sweeping team from the P&A Platoon, that very afternoon.
When the sun had set just enough that I could not see if the Chinese were moving down from their nearest hill; I suggested to the Patrol Leader that it was time to move out. After a few seconds, the patrol started on their way, moving all too cautiously. Fearing that they would not arrive on Jack before the Chinese could possibly be there; if they continued at that pace; I quickly overtook the point man and led them out at a rapid in less than ten minutes. There was no reasonable chance of enemy contact that quickly; so I didn’t even take the time to get my carbine (I was, of course, always armed with a 45 revolver); and I thought that I would be returning to the MLR as soon as the patrol was all set up on Jack. It didn’t quite work out that way.
From your 3rd. Platoon sector on the main ridge you probably heard two BARs and about ten M2 carbines ripping apart a very surprised Chinese patrol. I had just phoned in to the CP to report that the support patrol was in position; and to request that sentries be alerted that I would be returning to the MLR by way of Queen, King, & Ace. Needless to say, my stay was extended, through a brisk five to ten minute fire fight, while sitting on top of Point Jack; beside an old foxhole fully occupied by the patrol leader and communications man.
After the initial ambush had caught the enemy in a withering crossfire between the two flanking BARs; and one of the Chinese survivors yelled out a command; we would have assumed that it was an order to retreat; but for Sergeant Hu’s amazing interpretation. I was not aware of George Hu’s ethnic Chinese background; but I did not question Providence— I immediately ordered the patrol to stay in their diamond formation and to prepare for an assault from the rear.
It was an extremely long ten or fifteen minutes of tense waiting in complete silence. There had been no calls for a medic during the initial fire-fight; but one of our patrol had been killed at some point.
As I sat there pondering the situation; I realized that the screening patrol had probably been canceled before they ever left the MLR; and wondered whether or not the Chinese would send out any reinforcements— if so, we would be the initial contact; and it wasn’t very comforting to realize that we were actually closer to enemy positions than to our own MLR.
Never once did I mentally question the validity of Sergeant Hu’s warning; but I was not really sure of what the Chinese might consider to be the “rear” of our position; they could attack from either side, or from some angle to our rear. So the only thing I could do was to stay there on top of the hill by the radio & phone; while trying to present as low a profile as possible and still be alert to any sound or movement on that moonless night.
I simply lay there on my back with one arm propping up my head so as to observe down the hill to the rear; and the other arm holding a 1917 Army Colt revolver pointed (not aimed) along the path coming up from Checkpoint Queen; that 45 caliber revolver was a perfectly balanced extension to my arm; so it never entered my mind that I might fail to stop an enemy attacker in his tracks at the ten yard sight distance, imposed by night fighting; although it would have felt much better to also have an M2 carbine with several fully loaded banana clips.
We lost another man and some of us were wounded by a Chinese mortar barrage as we returned to the MLR later that night; evidently fired in retaliation for our unusual success at nearly wiping out one of their patrols.
Word of just how hard they had been hit was late in getting back to them because even their communications man had participated in their last assault. We carried him back to our lines- complete with two partially filled “doughnut” rolls of wire strapped to his back. Had they realized how bad it was earlier; they most certainly would have blasted Jack & Queen; rather than waiting until we were almost home on checkpoint Ace.
Don Maxey