Jake’s Valentine Odyssey
The 32nd Infantry Regiment of the 7th Division had Companies L, I, and K, in that order, holding the Main Line of Resistance ( MLR ) along the Yokkok-Chon (River) in North Korea, just northwest of Chorwon, from Christmas 1952 to March 1953. Outpost (OP) Item was located about two miles west of Old Baldy and Pork Chop; on a small oval knob along a narrow sub-ridge running down into the rice paddies from our MLR. The paddies filled a crescent of fertile land beneath a large southwestern loop in the Yok-Kok-Chon (an east trending fork of the Imjim River ). The Chinese MLR [more accurately described as a broad zone of deeply tunneled compounds] occupied the hills along the north side of the river; confronting all three line companies of the 3rd Battalion: (Love, Item, & King) defending almost two miles of the MLR. One of the Chinese units facing Outpost Item just north of the “Yok” was a special psych warfare outfit that was preparing a horrendous Valentine’s Day greeting for the 27 GIs on Outpost Item.
OP Item was occupied by an under-strength platoon of about 27 men; armed with four 30 cal. machine guns, a broken 50 cal. machine gun, and three Browning Automatic Rifles (BARs); in addition to each man’s small arms and grenades. Item Company’s 3rd Platoon (commanded by 2LT Richard Moulthrop) had been assigned to that outpost for over a month [a long tour for outpost duty]. “On the eve of Valentine’s Day [Friday 13 February 1953] we were only on 50 per-cent alert; even though the Chinese propaganda unit on the hills just beyond the Yokkok-Chon [River] had been blaring out muffled threats all day.
“We’re coming to get you tonight GI! Lay down your arms!”
Early on the morning of Friday February 13th Lieutenant Moulthrop, in order to facilitate safe passage of patrols on down into the valley, requested that PFC Jake Schaper and PFC James Wielert “volunteer” to clear a path through a minefield at the rear of the outpost; and down the right flank toward the river in front of King Company. Schaper and Wielert (both just newly arrived to Korea in late December) were selected for this mine sweeping mission because they had just been transferred to Item Company from the Third Battalion P&A (Pioneer & Ammunition) Platoon where they had received an expedient “on-the-job-training” by a Demolitions Sergeant overdue to rotate home; both men had been attached to Item Company TDY ; supposedly under a command directive that every man in the “rear echelons” must be sent to a “line unit” until qualified for the highly coveted Combat Infantry Badge ( CIB ). [A more pragmatic reason for this transfer, from a command point-of-view, was to help fill in the badly depleted ranks of frontline units during the last winter of the Korean War.]
As Jake and James carefully worked their way down the hill and partly across the river bottom; they used a long metal “probe stick” with a thin wire extending from its end to “feel” for the trip wires stretched through the weeds to a “Bouncing Betty” anti-personnel mine. If the flexible probe; extremely “touch sensitive” shins; or very sharp eyes; all fail to detect the trip wire; then you might hear the sickening metallic click as the explosive head of the mine is launched into the air about shoulder height — if you are both extremely fast and lucky — you might drop toward the ground fast enough to avoid decapitation. The combined threat, and restriction, of these mine fields prompted several line officers to request P&A teams to clear and mark patrol paths; usually with green engineer’s tape. We had lost too many men.
It was usually a “no sweat” job for one or two men to walk around in “no-man’s-land”, during daylight, as long as you stayed on our side of the river — however, at times, an uneasy feeling would sweep over you — as if you were being watched; and you probably were. As if mine clearing wasn’t stressful enough, on that Friday 13th of February 1953, there was the haunting sound of distant music, fading in and out, from Chinese loud speakers across the river. Occasionally the music would stop and an oriental dialect would issue a muffled warning about some impending doom for ” GI Joe “. This was more than enough to ignite any smoldering depression — and James Wielert seemed more depressed than most. He was moved to casually remark to Jake Schaper , “This is my last day”. Puzzled, Jake replied, “What do you mean?” and James answered, “I have to go — it’s my turn”.
Later that evening both Jake and James had been previously scheduled for Listening Post duty on the eight to midnight shift with their squad leader PFC Willard Nickens. The LP was a non-fortified position well outside the protective barbed wire perimeter; accessed by a shallow trench extending deeper into “no-mans-land” another forty yards down toward the river. The function of an LP is to quietly observe, & listen, so as to provide early warning of an approaching enemy. Any suspicious activity must be reported to the CP immediately; after getting their attention by softly blowing into the “sound powered phone” and whispering, “CP – CP”. The LP crew should be withdrawn as soon as it reports and confirms that warning to a Command Post.
“We Hear Movement”
It was around 2130 (9:30PM) when PFC Nickens spoke softly into the phone from the listening post (LP) to the Outpost CP, “We hear movement in the valley”. The Sergeant monitoring the CP phone responded, “It was probably a King Company patrol out tonight on our right flank.” Normally an LP phone line would also be “hot looped” into the Company CP on the MLR ; and monitored continuously by the “duty officer”, or NCO, right up until the last shift is called in. They continued to “hear movement” drifting up from the valley, on both sides, from about ten o’clock until midnight; PFC Nickens , the ranking man on the LP, repeated the warning shortly after 2200 (10:PM). Sometime later PFC Schaper, worried that the CP bunker might not be taking PFC Nicken’s warning seriously; quietly reached over and lifted the sound powered phone from his squad leader’s ear, and spoke as firmly as possible, without alerting whom, or whatever, was out there: “WE HAVE BEEN HEARING MOVEMENT ON BOTH FLANKS; AND NOW FROM THE FRONT!” – But still no withdrawal order was issued. About a quarter past midnight; Schaper, Nickens, and Wielert were relieved by three Puerto Rican GIs, who were told, “We have been hearing movement all around us for over two hours; you should call the CP as soon as you get set up and ask to come in!”. The panic was palpable, but silent, as the two crews squeezed past each other in the narrow com trench leading back to OP Item. Five, of these six men, would not survive the night! The three Puerto Rican GIs were found dead the next morning lying together in a small “cave” dug into the trench wall just behind the listening post.
A Chilling Calm Before the Storm
PFCs Willard Nickens, Jake Schaper , and James Wielert moved cautiously back to the outpost, up the dark narrow ridge, not knowing what to expect — but keeping their carbines at the ready! Upon their entry into the deeper perimeter trench surrounding the outpost — they hoped to find a battle alert Third Platoon — but they were greeted by only one, seemingly unconcerned sentry; standing guard at the front entrance to the OP; when ask if he had heard anything, or knew what was going on, he replied in the negative to both questions [He had probably just arrived on guard from his sleeping bunker]. The rest of the outpost was eerily quiet!— even though extremely cold and exhausted after clearing mines all day in “no-man’s-land”; followed by four hours of harrowing LP duty while lying prone on the solidly frozen Korean soil — they were still determined to warn as many as possible that an attack was surely only minutes away. The three soldiers parted ways upon entering the OP perimeter trench; PFC Nickens going to the left; while Schaper and Wielert turned to the right; in order to awaken as many as possible — both to warn of an impending attack, as well as to test their own perceptions — that all hell was about to break loose!
PFC Nickens took the perimeter trench to the left so as to reach his squad’s assigned defensive sector on the East flank, facing King Company [It also happened to overlook a major trail intersection on a likely enemy assault route]. PFCs Schaper and Wielert took the West trench overlooking the river bottom in front of Love Company. They had to take care moving through the six foot deep trench; — it was pitch black on this “dark moon night” and they didn’t wish to startle any GI with a fully loaded carbine; nor did they desire to suddenly come muzzle to muzzle with a burp gun — and the toughest challenge of all – was to determine which was which — within the split second that separates the living from the dead! [And you must face this challenge with either a gloved (or a near frozen) hand, while holding a very cold weapon that has been known to misfire when either dusty or frozen.]
Jake was still hoping that someone could tell him what is going on; but the fighting positions along the perimeter trenches were all unoccupied. Maybe the noise they had heard drifting up from the valley was just a friendly patrol; perhaps their perceptions of an impending attack would be tempered by “cooler”, more combat seasoned members, of the platoon; perhaps it was because they were so new to the company; and with little, or no, combat experience. As Jake and James continued on back through the outpost, the bitterly cold night only deepened a chilling thought racing through Jake ‘s mind: “Where the hell is everybody? Has the whole damned platoon been withdrawn to the MLR — did we just not get the word?” That was a thought too ominous to share aloud — especially with the apprehensive Wielert.
As they approached the back side of the outpost where Wielert’s sleeping bunker was located, Jake attempted to persuade him to stay in the trenches and continue on around the outpost to join up with the rest of the squad; “We’ll have a better chance in the trenches!”; but James continued to insist,
“I’ve got to lay down and get some rest — to be ready for my journey” — as he continued on back,
passing the large buttoned up CP bunker; and on down to his bunker at the back entrance to the outpost — an unguarded entrance that was only blocked by a short coil of concertina wire that was easily lifted out of the trench when passing through. Wielert was quartered in the first bunker as youentered the outpost, the “commo bunker”, so called because it also housed a junction of phone lines leading in from the MLR through a five foot deep, by three foot wide commo trench.
The “commo trench” extended more than five football fields through “no-man’s-land” along the sub-ridge to Item Company’s front line (the MLR ). A trench of that size would most likely have been hand dug by South Korean Civilian Labor Corp laborers earlier in the war; and it’s existence was almost certainly well known to Chinese scouts and North Korean spies. It was too deep to see out of, in most places, because of the dirt piled up along the edge; coils of concertino barbed wire had been stretched along some parts of the trench in a futile attempt to block enemy access. Item Company’s Officers must have been concerned about this long, unguarded, threat to their front, because they had ordered troops into the trench just the day before (February 13th) to hang clusters of c-ration cans on the barbed wire, along the shoulders of the trench, as a make-shift alarm — events would soon confirm their worst fears.
A ” Bangalore ” in the Commo Bunker
PFCs Jake Schaper and James Wielert parted ways, at a fork in the trench, near the back of the outpost; where the unguarded “Ammo” trench came in from the MLR ; it must have been around 12:30am . Jake continued counter-clockwise around the East flank to his squads fighting positions overlooking the valley in front of King Company; while James made his way into the darkened commo bunker in search of the “rest” that he had been talking about all day — it was to be his last entry into the snug, down-filled, sleeping bag that shielded him from the frigid Korean air — but not from bullets or hot steel shrapnel.
Jake was determined to warn as many others in the platoon of his conviction that they were about to be hit — he especially had to get his buddy Private Willie Wells out of his bunker and into their battle station to man their 30 cal. machine gun. The gun was mounted in a bunker, on a corner shoulder of the outpost, overlooking a junction of old farm trails down on the valley floor; two ofthese trails led up into Item Company’s position on the crest of the main ridge; one climbed along a small intermittent stream that branched directly into a low- gap intersecting the long “commo” trench between the MLR and the Outpost.
Evidently, Jake had just entered Well’s sleeping bunker, in order to roust him out of his arctic bag and into the trench; and so he did not hear the initial opening of the battle by some unknown GIs; [Most likely SGT Russell Horne, or even the moribund James Wielert, both of whom were quartered in that “commo bunker” whose door faced directly toward the rear entrance to the outpost]. Shortly after one AM someone had opened fire on enemy troops attempting to come out of that deep MLR communications trench at the back entrance to the OP perimeter trench; perhaps having been alerted by the rattling of C-ration cans that had been tied to the barbed wire just days earlier. PV2 Richard “Rick” Burnett was into the first hour of his “walking-guard” post along the short access trench leading down to a right-rear machinegun position only about fifteen yards to the east of the MLR access “com-trench”. He is the only surviving witness to the first shots fired that bitterly cold North Korean night of February 14, 19 53; and he is certain that it was “our guys firing”; he also reports hearing screams afterwards which he took to be enemy soldiers who were hit in that first burst of firing. Private Burnett immediately responded by throwing several grenades over into the area where he could hear and see muzzle flashes, at close range, just across the small intervening trench leading to an unmanned flame thrower that separated his sentry position at the MG from the main access com-trench coming from the MLR . This firing was quickly followed by a loud explosion as the Chinese placed what is thought to have been a “bangalore torpedo” into the “commo bunker” that had housed Horne and Wielert – clearing the way for them to swarm on into the top center of the outpost; and to move left “clock-wise” around the perimeter trench toward the Command Post. That exploding Bangalore also served as the alarm that jolted most of the remainder of the third platoon of Item Company out of their sleeping bags and into the trenches.
Jake had barely rousted his buddy Well’s out of his sleeping bunker; “when all hell broke loose”
–a large explosion and the staccato ripping of burp guns, punctuated with grenades bursts, abruptly split the clear night air — “and as we rushed to the machine gun bunker I saw the fleeting image of a chink soldier behind us; running along the crest of the outpost hill; he was briefly silhouetted by the light from a white phosphorus explosion glaring up from the other side of the knob;” it was all too obvious that Outpost Item had been overrun! Shocked into a major adrenalin rush, the two GIs simply reverted to their training mode — “it seemed as though we were in a slow motion nightmare as we ran through the trenches to jump on the machine gun and start firing”. They laid down a blistering “field-of-fire” that had been prearranged along the shoulder of the outpost — almost certainly causing heavy casualties, and major disruption, of CCF exploitation columns still winding up the hill — most likely saving the platoon from being completely overwhelmed early in the battle. When the “latch pin” broke, PFC Schaper and Private Wells had to hold the cover down with their hands — even though the hot latch cover began scorching their gloves — they continued to fire until the weapon jammed completely before they moved back into the trench.
The 32nd Infantry Regimental Command Report for the month of February 1953 includes an attachment: “Unit Report No. 407” Headquarters 3rd Battalion; stating that at 140110 Hrs [14 Feb 1:10 a.m.], I Co Outpost [Item] was attacked by an estimated Enemy Company of the 422nd Regiment, 141st Division of the CCF Field Army. At 140550 Hrs [14 Feb 5:50 a.m.], Enemy disengaged and withdrew. “Friendly Casualties: 7 KIA, 3 MIA , 31 WIA” [ Lt. Moultrop recalls only 27 men on the OP; Counterattacks from the MLR sustained casualties as well.]. “Enemy Casualties: 20 counted KIA, 30 Estimated KIA, and 35 Estimated WIA.”One of the friendly MIAs escaped by killing his guard with a pocket knife 1000 yards from friendly lines” [PV2 Ken Madison]
Having been too busy to focus on anything else except keeping their overheated machine gun firing; PFC Schaper and Private Wells must now turn their attention to the furious fire-fight raging across the outpost immediately behind their backs – but it was almost too late — because the enemy who had survived the withering machine gun fire had now penetrated the outpost from the rear and were swarming over the center crest, and perimeter trenches, to methodically “mop-up” any GIs still offering resistance (especially machine gun positions) – they had just silenced the matching left-front MG by shooting the lone gunner [PFC Frederick Fagan] in the back from inside his own trench — and were continuing clock-wise around to the right front just as Schaper and Wells had stepped back into the totally dark trench.
The two of them were then faced with diabolic uncertainty as to what to do next – which way to turn – as the heat of battle closed upon them? They chose instinctively to stand their ground –back to back – using their carbines to fire at any human shape appearing on the skyline; or any movement from either direction within the trench. As dark as it was above the trench – it was even darker within – so the more adventurous Chinese soldiers would occasionally jump over the trench in order to draw a tell-tale muzzle flash from GIs – hoping to disappear on the other side before you could fire effectively in their direction. If there was no response from within the trench; the more aggressive enemy would consider it a safe point-of-entry from which to continue their mopping-up operation.
This tense standoff continued a few brief moments until Jake felt the sickening impact of the slugs fired into Willie ’s chest; and then felt his friend’s body sliding down his back. Jake spun around to return fire on their attacker – but nothing could be seen; so he advanceded aggressively into the darkness toward the front of the OP to join with his squad leader PFC Willard Nickens and PFC Phil Puentes. At that point a grenade landed between PFC Schaper and Nickens causing a severe injury to Nickens and a concussion to PFC Schaper . PFC Puentes began shaking PFC Schaper and asking his help applying a tourniquet to Nicken’s leg. They both pulled Nickens into a “cave” and told him to loosen the tourniquet every ten minutes to keep the blood flowing in his leg. Puentes and Schaper returned to the trench where they met another GI just as more grenades continued to be rolled into the trench; one of them wounded the other GI in the leg; so they brought him into the same cave with Nickens; attended to his wound; and then Schaper and Puentes returned to the trench and positioned themselves back to back. It was all too obvious now that the Chinese had totally occupied the top center of the outpost and were using their higher position from which to toss and roll grenades down onto GIs in the perimeter trench. Schaper then turned around to find Puentes was gone – so both by instinct and by training; he decided to move back along the trench to the King Company side of the outpost where he met up with two other GI’s. The three GI’s proceeded back toward the rear of the outpost where they were miraculously and mercifully challenged by Private Burnett from his prone position at the entryway to the right-rear MG bunker where he had participated in the first attempt to stop the initial Chinese assault through our own MLR com-trench gate. By luck, training, and the Grace-of-God; the four soldiers did not open fire on each other: but kept their cool, and regrouped, to continue clockwise around the trench, hoping to join with other G I’s who could still be heard fighting in the vicinity of the Platoon CP and the “mortar-ring” at the SW corner of the OP.
They had barely started when all four were frozen in their tracks by the sound of approaching Chinese — from several directions! Someone ask, “Which way should we go?” and Rick Burnett yelled, “Lets drop over the side” (into the margin between the barbed wire and the trench parapet); so one by one they scrambled over the sand-bagged wall – all except PV2 John Daves Jr. who was grabbed and taken prisoner by the Chinese before he could escape. PFC Jacob Schaper, PV2 Rick Burnett, and the third GI remained there; “with our weapons pointed up hill and would have shot anyone who looked over the top. “The Chinese were walking back and forth just above us, taking everything they could carry. Then the artillery really started coming in. Some ours and some theirs. It was right above our hill and we were sure we would be hit; but somehow we lucked out.”; until 0550 (5:50 am) when the enemy withdrew from the hill. They were also subjected to the hair-raising protective fire from a King Company 50 caliber machine gun that raked up and down the right flank of their outpost with tracers that seemed to stop just before strikng their precarious position. These three GIs were the only survivors from the East and South sides of Outpost Item to climb back into the trenches at daybreak on that Valentines Day morning of 1953.
Were it not for PFC Jake Schaper’s initiative, bravery, and decisive action, throughout this battle – outpost Item would most likely have been overwhelmed completely by this Friday the 13th surprise attack – with many more GI casualties. This after-action report is composed of eyewitness accounts of events that occurred on Friday 13th, and Saturday 14 February 1953; as testified in detail to the undersigned combat infantry officer in both separate, and joint, interviews of six survivors of the Chinese assault on Outpost Item northwest of Chorwon North Korea.
_______________________
Capt Donald R. Maxey (Ret)
Plt Ldr and CO of the adjoining Co K
32d Regiment 7th Infantry Division